Jhang was the first district in Punjab province to fall prey to the ongoing phase of sectarian violence. This phase started in 1985 with formation of the Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) by Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi. The professed objectives of SSP included struggle against the so-called excesses of Shias vis-a- vis the Sunnis. The SSP demanded the government to declare Shias non-Muslim through legislation, besides criticising Iran for supporting them. The Shia community, which had already become politicised in the wake of Iranian revolution and the formation of Tahrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqah-i-Jafria (TNFJ), reacted strongly. Soon Jhang had to become the centre of sectarian activism. Not only an increased number of violent incidents started happening but also that the Shia-Sunni sectarian divide became a useful tool in the hands of Sunni candidates to bag a sizeable number of votes in district Jhang. It was only at a later stage that the SSP and its dissident groups expanded their activities to other parts of the country. It is, therefore, important to know the dynamics of sectarian conflict in the socio-political context of district Jhang to be able to objectively understand it. 

It may be noted that analysts enumerate many causes for the ongoing phase of sectarian violence. These generally include the Islamisation process under Gen. Zia (which triggered a race among different sects to fight for their own brand of Islam to be accepted by the state), the crisis of governance, the easy availability of weapons and external support to the local sectarian groups. But, how these macro level developments translate themselves into sectarian conflict at the micro level, generally, skip their attention. Consequently, the local socio-economic realities with possible implications for violence, both at the local and national levels, are not analysed and given due consideration in public policy formulation processes. 

A recent study by this author, which focused on Jhang for data, argues that the sectarian conflict has arisen on account of the struggle for political space by two contending forces. On the one hand are the traditional feudal families, who historically commanded almost total control of political leadership of the district. On the other hand is the emerging middle class, largely urban based, consisted of migrant traders and artisans which sought political recognition, but found itself blocked by the wall of feudal dominance. Given that the feudal leadership is primarily Shia, majority of the population Sunni, and majority of the emerging middle class Deobandi or Ahli-Hadith non-Shias, the latter adopted the sectarian platform to confront Shia feudal power. In this context, although the overt battle lines are sectarian, the underlying cause of sectarianism is class struggle. 

The above argument is based on the following key findings of the field work conducted in the Jhang district:

1) With regard to the sectarian violence, the local contextual realities play critical role. The external stimuli might have played some catalyst role in terms of triggering and accelerating the process of shift from the dormant sectarian conflict to the violent one, but what is important to note is that the potency of external stimuli and the nature of reaction they might provoke are determined at the local levels. The likelihood of shift from dormant to violent conflict, however, increases if the institutional and legal structures in a given state fail to adjust and accommodate to the changing socio-economic realities, and/or lack capacity to effectively respond and check the external stimuli. It is, therefore, of little use to keep blaming others for the sectarian violence at home. 

2) The sectarian conflict in Jhang is primarily a manifestation of the changing nature of relations of production, which has given rise to socio-economic and political tensions among different classes of society. This class conflict invariably finds an anti-Shia expression largely because most of the leading feudal lords in the district happen to be Shia. For these Shia feudal lords, their land and peasantry serve as a source of power. In addition, they draw power from their contacts with the leading politicians and bureaucrats of the country. Most importantly, however, their power originates from the backwardness of the majority of population in their respective areas of influence. In this situation, the new emerging middle class, with political aspirations, finds it politically expedient to use the anti-Shia idiom, which has the potential to mobilise the Sunni masses in its support. 

3) The incidence of sectarian violence in Jhang increased after the settlement of muhajirs, mostly from eastern part of Punjab, now in India. Their religious identity had been sharpened as a result of the experience of Pakistan movement and partition. They settled in the urban parts of Jhang and got involved in trade, small businesses, weaving of carpets, etc. Most of them were Sunnis who included a sizeable number of Deobandis and Ahli-Hadith. Since both the Deobandi and Ahli-Hadith communities had a long history of religious and political activism, as manifested by Ahrar, Khaksar, and Jamiat Ulma-i-Hind (JUH) before 1947, their leadership got actively involved in politics. This amounted to challenging the monopoly of Shia feudal lords in the locality. However, the muhajir leadership could not win elections and thus effectively challenge the feudal lords by just mobilising the muhajir population, which constituted just a small minority. Consequently, it found it useful to exploit the anti-Shia sentiment to move the local Sunni population against the monopoly of well-entrenched Shia feudal lords. It may be noted that the local Sunni population was part of the feudal system and it was inconceivable for a large majority of it to stand against the dominant feudal lords. Yet they were deeply religious and were activated to defend what they perceive the ”honour of the Companions of the Prophet” against Shias.

4) A spatial analysis of sectarian conflict reveals that the Shia-Sunni violence has been more intense and frequent in the areas inhabited by muhajirs. Many of the known terrorists of Jhang district, especially on the Sunni side, also come from the muhajir communities. On the Shia side, however, the role of locals in Shia politics or violence is more prominent. This gives the problem, at least in certain localities, the local-muhajir dimension. Nonetheless, it is clear from the data collected from Jhang that muhajirs are more sensitive towards situations of sectarian conflict.
Even on the Shia side, muhajirs, though they are in very small number, remain on the forefront of violent activities. The violent tendency of muhajirs in the district may be explained in terms of their uprootedness and the fact that, unlike the local population, they do not share familial relations going back to generations.

5) The emerging middle class in Jhang, after having attained relative prosperity, has begun to strive for its political recognition. This category of emerging middle class is overlapping with that of muhajirs who, as mentioned above, are largely businessmen and/or are involved in petty trades. This class has particularly been active in the municipal area of Jhang where it could manage to win the provincial assembly seats since 1970 elections. By late 1990s, however, the middle class had significantly grown in many of the towns all across the district. The struggle for political recognition by this class is, therefore, no more limited to the municipal area of Jhang. This class too, like muhajirs, consists predominantly of Sunnis and hence tends to play on the anti-Shia sentiment in the process of finding a political space of its own in the district. This is evident from the fact that the SSP has been winning sizeable number of votes in the municipal area.

6) Within the Shia community, the strengthening of ulema under the influence of Iranian revolution and TJP, as compared to the feudal dominated zakirin and khateebs, has led to a relative decline in the power of Shia feudal lords. The Shia population now looks towards the ulema/TJP for leadership and not as much towards the Shia feudal lords. In the new role, the ulema provide motivation and guidance to the Shia youth wings and the religious minded population and thus they have emerged as a new power centre. This change is significant but remains unnoticed because the anti-Shia violence and rhetoric perpetrated by SSP has pushed them to stay united in the face of common ’enemy’. It has affected the nature of Shia-Sunni relations in two important ways: (a) the activism generated in the Shia community by increasingly powerful role of ulema with puritan emphasis is perceived as a threat by the Sunni population; and (b) the Shia feudal lords can no longer effectively play the role of crisis managers at the community levels. So has their influence on the Shia activists been diminished over the years, but the Sunni population still identifies them with Shia activism. Ironically, feudal power has, in some important ways, been checked not by class struggle but by intensification of sectarian divides. 

7) Until 1970s, the exploitation of anti-Shia sentiment in Jhang had yielded no significant political benefits to the muhajirs or the emerging middle classes. By then, the electoral constituencies were too big for them to affect any change. Moreover, the emerging middle class was numerically weak to pose any serious challenge to the established order. As a result, the major beneficiaries of anti-Shia sentiment, which was invariably invoked before or during the elections, were the Sunni feudal lords of relatively lower cadre. These Sunni feudal lords had very strong social relations with the Shias; and for that reason, they never allowed to let the anti-Shia campaign go beyond a certain level. However, they proved to be equally disappointing to the muhajirs and emerging middle classes, not only on the performance front but also in terms of their attitudes. Besides, as the social structure remained feudal dominated the muhajirs and emerging middle classes continued to operate outside the feudal system. By mid 1980s, however, they were able to put forward an active resistance by supporting the leadership of SSP in which they found potential to affect a change. In the new phase, the anti-Shia campaign led by SSP got violent, partly because more assertive and active role was now being played by the middle classes. 

The above findings, though largely based on the data gathered from Jhang, amply suggest that sectarian conflict has its roots into our socio-political realities, and it cannot be dispelled as a mere manifestation of religious intolerance or easy availability of weapons. The fact that the sectarian conflict has affected South Punjab more than its other parts also indicates to the underlying power struggle along class lines within a feudal dominated setup.

The author works as a research officer with the Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues (IBHI), Islamabad. Above were the major findings of his study on The Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: A Case Study of Jhang. The study was conducted under the Kodikara Award by the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS), Colombo, Sri Lanka.